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HAS THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT FALLEN
ON DEAF EARS? A POST-SUTTON ANALYSIS OF
MITIGATING MEASURES IN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
MOLLY M. JOYCE*
INTRODUCTION
When Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act1
("ADA") in 1990, it was lauded as a statute that would bring long-
overdue equal protection to some forty-three million2 disabled
Americans.3 Yet as the ADA recently enjoyed its tenth anniversary,
commentators question whether the statute is meeting all of its in-
tended goals.4 Although most agree that the ADA has fostered great
progress for the disabled in the areas of public accommodations and
public services,5 many observers question whether Title I of the
ADA,6 the provision prohibiting employment discrimination, ade-
* J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, 2002. I am
particularly grateful to Professor Mary Rose Strubbe for her continuing support and wisdom
throughout the writing process. Thank you also to Pam Quigley for her help and
encouragement, and a special thanks to Heidi Rowe for her patience.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1); see also Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 484-88
(1999) (finding that Congress most likely settled on this figure by first relying on a 1988 study
conducted by the National Counsel on Disability that found 37.3 million Americans had
"functional limitations," and then adding the additional 5.7 million to include those who
probably were excluded from the initial study).
3. See Statement on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, PUB. PAPERS
(JULY 26, 1990), in which President George H.W. Bush stated that the ADA would "open up all
aspects of American life to individuals with disabilities."
4. See Wendy E. Parmet, Plain Meaning and Mitigating Measures: Judicial Interpretations
of the Meaning of Disability, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 53 (2000); Ruth Colker, The
Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99
(1999).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 12181-12189. According to Title III of the ADA, "[nlo individual shall be
discriminated against on the basis of a disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public
accommodation." § 12182(a). For example, "failure to remove architectural barriers...
communication barriers that are structural in nature ... and transportation barriers" are
considered discriminatory. § 12182(2)(a). See also Thomas W. Snyder, Ten Year Analysis: Is the
ADA Meeting Its Goals?, 14 CBA REc. 36 (2000).
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117.
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quately protects all of those whom Congress originally intended to
cover.
7
One of the biggest hurdles that employment discrimination
plaintiffs face is initially proving that they qualify as "disabled" 8 under
the statute. Courts have so narrowly interpreted the term "dis-
ability," which is defined by the ADA as "a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life ac-
tivities," that employment discrimination plaintiffs are left with a
success rate as bleak as plaintiffs struggling for prisoner's rights.10 For
example, the Seventh Circuit1' has found that cirrhosis of the liver
caused by chronic Hepatitis B is not a disability, 2 asthma, osteoporo-
sis and a weakened immune system are not disabilities, 13 and, in one
case, an amputated leg failed to qualify as a disability.1 4 Statistically
speaking, one researcher found that of the 117 cases brought before
the Seventh Circuit in 2000 claiming employment discrimination un-
der the ADA, only three plaintiffs prevailed on the merits of their
cases. 5
Arguably the most devastating blow to plaintiffs claiming that
they are substantially limited in a major life activity, and thus disabled
under the ADA, is the Supreme Court's 1999 decision in Sutton v.
United Airlines, Inc.16 The Court held in Sutton that when determin-
ing whether a plaintiff is disabled, courts must take into consideration
the mitigating or corrective measures that a plaintiff relies upon to
alleviate the symptoms of his or her impairment, such as medications,
7. See Parmet, supra note 4.
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(A). Disability is also defined as "a record of such an impairment"
under § 12102(2)(B) and "being regarded as having such an impairment" under § 12102(2)(C).
10. See Colker, supra note 4 at 100.
11. This Note focuses exclusively on the effects of Sutton in the Seventh Circuit because
the sheer volume of ADA case law would be intractable in the space of a note.
12. Furnish v. SVI Sys. Inc., 270 F.3d 445,449-51 (7th Cir. 2001).
13. Webb v. Clyde L. Choate Mental Health and Dev. Ctr., 230 F.3d 991, 998-99 (7th Cir.
2000).
14. Moore v. County of Cook, No. 99-4202, 2000 WL 989618, at *3 (7th Cir. 2000). In
Moore, the jury found that the plaintiff was not disabled. When the plaintiff challenged the jury
instructions on appeal as being vague, the court found that the instructions did not lead to a
"miscarriage of justice."
15. Amy L. Allbright, 2000 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title I-Survey Update,
25 MENTAL AND PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 508, 510 (2001). When all thirteen federal
circuits were analyzed together, 96.4 percent of the cases resulted in employer wins and 3.6
percent in employee wins. Id. at 509.
16. 527 U.S. 471.
[Vol. 77:1389
HAS THE ADA FALLEN ON DEAF EARS?
assistive devices or prostheses. 7 For example, after Sutton, most
courts have found that diabetics who are able to control their im-
pairments through the use of insulin, a corrective measure, are not
disabled under the ADA.18 What the Sutton Court failed to consider
was that plaintiffs claiming that their employer interfered with or dis-
criminated against them on the basis of the actual mitigating measure
itself, are not protected under the ADA. At first glance, it would
seem that if an employer refuses to allow a diabetic employee to take
short insulin breaks on the job to control the impairment, the em-
ployee would have a legitimate discrimination claim under the ADA.
Yet, under Sutton, before determining the discrimination claim, the
court would be forced to find that, with the help of the insulin, the
diabetic is not disabled and thus, not protected under the ADA. 19
Certainly Congress did not intend such a disparate result when it en-
acted the statute that promised to "provide a clear and comprehen-
sive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities.
'20
This Note proposes that the protection of the ADA should be
extended to plaintiffs whose employers interfere with or discriminate
on the basis of their using mitigating measures, without which they
would be considered disabled. Part I of this Note will investigate the
language of the ADA and discuss the Supreme Court's process, which
courts follow to determine whether a plaintiff is disabled, namely
through the Bragdon v. Abbott21 and Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc.22
opinions. Part II of this Note will consider how the Seventh Circuit
17. Id. at 475. On the same day that Sutton was decided, two other related decisions were
announced. See Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Ina, 527 U.S. 516 (1999); Albertson's, Inc. v.
Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999). In Murphy, the plaintiff claimed that he was disabled because
he had hypertension that, when untreated, significantly restricted his major life activity of
working. 527 U.S. at 521. The Court, noting that the issue was settled by Sutton, affirmed the
appellate court's holding that the plaintiff was not disabled. Id.
In Kirkingburg, the plaintiff, who had monocular vision, was fired from his job as a
truck driver once the employer learned of his impairment. 527 U.S. 555. The Court, in applying
the mitigating-measures test laid out in Sutton, overturned the Ninth Circuit's decision that the
plaintiff was substantially limited in the major life activity of seeing. Id. at 565. The Court
determined that because the plaintiff's brain had developed a subconscious mechanism for
coping with his monocular vision, a mitigating measure in a sense, he was not disabled for the
purposes of the ADA. Id.
18. See Denney v. Mosey Mfg. Co., Inc., No. IP 98-852-C H/G, 2000 WL 680417, at *10
(S.D. Ind. Apr. 20, 2000).
19. Id.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
21. 524 U.S. 516 (1998).
22. 527 U.S. 471.
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has applied the Supreme Court's analysis of the ADA to plaintiffs
who claim that they are disabled; it will especially focus on the some-
times inconsistent effect that the Supreme Court's decision in Sutton
23
has had on cases in the Seventh Circuit. Finally, in Part III the author
argues that, in the wake of society's ever-increasing reliance upon
medication and assistive devices, courts should first consider whether
the employer interfered with the plaintiff's corrective measures or
discriminated against the plaintiff due to plaintiff's use of corrective
measures. If the court finds that there is a reasonable likelihood that
the employer is discriminating on the basis of the plaintiff's use of a
corrective measure or is refusing to allow the plaintiff to use a correc-
tive measure on the job, the court should disregard the mitigating
measure when determining whether the plaintiff is disabled in order
to successfully reach the merits of the discrimination claim.
I. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ADA AND HOW THE
SUPREME COURT HAS INTERPRETED ITS LANGUAGE
An investigation of the legislative history and congressional in-
tent behind the statute is necessary to fully appreciate the disparities
that have arisen in the Seventh Circuit's treatment of Title I ADA
plaintiffs. Also crucial is the Supreme Court's analysis of the statu-
tory language, most notably in the dispositive cases of Bragdon24 and
Sutton.25  Undoubtedly, the legislative history and the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the ADA's language have paved the narrow
road which courts have been forced to travel when determining dis-
ability.
A. The Legislative History and Purpose of the ADA
Congress enacted the ADA to protect millions of disabled
Americans26 from widespread discrimination, which it identified as a
"serious and pervasive social problem. ' '27 Congress recognized the
disabled "as a group [that] occup[ies] an inferior status socially, eco-
nomically, vocationally, and educationally. '28 In terms of employ-
23. Id.
24. Bragdon, 524 U.S. 516.
25. Sutton, 527 U.S. 471.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2). Congress recognized that some forty-three million Americans
were disabled.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2).
28. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 29 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 310.
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ment, the legislature found that about 8.2 million disabled people
wanted to work but were simply unable to find jobs, often because
employers refused to hire them based on irrational myths and stereo-
types about the disabled.2 9 Congress acknowledged that individuals
with disabilities who did work encountered discrimination in the
workplace. For example, Congress, relying on a 1989 US Census Bu-
reau study, found that men with disabilities earned 36 percent less
than nondisabled men, and women with disabilities earned 38 percent
less than their nondisabled counterparts.30 In addition to the disparity
in pay, a congressional subcommittee found that employers dis-
criminated against the disabled by intentionally setting job standards
that were impossible for many disabled persons to attain and by re-
fusing to make reasonable accommodations for the disabled.31 In
light of these findings, Congress recognized the necessity of a com-
prehensive statute that would encourage the disabled to pursue
meaningful employment while also challenging employers to debunk
irrational stereotypes that prevented them from employing the dis-
abled.3
2
The ADA was not the first Congressional effort to combat dis-
crimination against the disabled. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 197333 prohibits federally funded organizations from discrimi-
nating against the disabled.3 4 It became apparent by the early 1990's,
however, that the scope of the Rehabilitation Act was too narrow and
that discrimination was still rampant. Congress responded by enact-
ing the ADA, which was designed to include not only private but also
29. Id. at 314 (citing The lCD Survey of Disabled Americans: Bringing Disabled Americans
into the Mainstream, at 47-50); see also Lisa Eichhorn, Major Litigation Activities Regarding
Major Life Activities: The Failure of the "Disability" Definition in the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1405, 1414 (1999) (arguing that "the disadvantaged social and economic
status of many disabled people has resulted not from their disabilities themselves-which are
merely artificial constructs-but rather from societal discrimination against those viewed
disabled").
30. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 32 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.A.A.N. 314.
31. Id. at 315 (citing testimony presented to the Subcommittees by Arlene Mayerson of the
Disabilities Rights Education and Defense Fund).
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7). Congress found that "individuals with disabilities are a
discrete and insular minority who have been faced with restrictions and limitations [and]
subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment ... resulting from stereotypic
assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and
contribute to, society."
33. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 394 (codified as amended at 29




public employers,"5 and to prohibit discrimination against qualified
individuals with a disability. 36 When enacting the ADA, Congress
noted that the "ADA incorporates many of the standards of discrimi-
nation set out in regulations implementing section 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act. '37
When drafting Title I of the ADA, Congress was careful to bal-
ance the interests of disabled persons in achieving equality in the
workplace against the interests of private employers in maintaining
an effective workforce. 38 Under Title I of the ADA, employers with
fifteen or more employees are proscribed from discriminating "in re-
gard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or dis-
charge of employees, employee compensation, job training and other
terms, conditions and privileges of employment."3 9 But on the other
hand, the statute only protects those workers who are "qualified indi-
viduals with a disability," in other words, those who "with or without
reasonable accommodation can perform the essential functions of the
employment position." 4 Under this scheme, employers are not re-
quired to make accommodations for disabled employees unless they
are "reasonable ' 41 and do not place undue financial hardship 42 on the
employer. In general, courts have not overlooked employers' needs
under the ADA. Chief Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit exhibited
concern for the interests of the employer when he determined that
when "an impairment interferes with the individual's ability to per-
35. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) defines a covered entity as "an employer, employment agency,
labor organization, or joint labor-management committee."
36. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). A "qualified individual with a disability" is identified as "an
individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires."
37. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(1), at 23 (1990) reprinted in U.S.C.A.A.N. 304-05.
38. Id. at 337. When describing the purpose of requiring an employee to be able to
perform the "essential functions" of the employment position, Congress noted, "The point of
including this phrase ... is to ensure that employers can continue to require that all applicants
and employees, including those with disabilities, are able to perform the essential, i.e., the non-
marginal functions of the job in question."
39. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9). The term "reasonable accommodation" may include "a)
making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with
disabilities; and b) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a
vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or
modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers
or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities."
42. See § 12111(10)(a), defining "undue hardship" as "an action requiring significant
difficulty or expense, when considered in light of the factors set forth in subparagraph (B)."
Some of the factors set forth in (B) include the nature and cost of the accommodation, financial
resources of the facility, the size of the entity and the entity's type of operation.
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form up to the standards of the workplace, or increases the cost of
employing him, hiring and firing decisions based upon the impairment
are not 'discriminatory' in a sense closely analogous to employment
discrimination on racial grounds.
'43
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA,
a plaintiff must prove that they are a qualified individual with a dis-
ability, that they are otherwise qualified to perform the essential func-
tions of the job, and that they were discriminated against on the basis
of their disability.44 The ADA defines an individual with a disability
as one who: "(A) has a physical or mental impairment that substan-
tially limits one or more of that individual's major life activities, (B)
has a record of such an impairment, or (C) is regarded as having such
an impairment."' 41 This Note will focus exclusively on subsection (A)
because a large majority of the disability controversy centers on this
definition. The Supreme Court in Bragdon discussed in detail how
courts should analyze whether a plaintiff is disabled under subsection
(A).4
6
B. The Bragdon Disability Framework
Although the definition of disability under the ADA is simple to
articulate, courts have struggled with applying the language of the
statute, particularly in determining what constitutes a "major life ac-
tivity" and to what extent a plaintiff is considered "substantially lim-
ited." During this struggle, the Supreme Court held in Bragdon47 that
reproduction is a major life activity and set forth a three-step analysis
that courts should utilize in determining whether an individual has "a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of
that individual's major life activities,"48 and is thus disabled for the
purposes of the ADA. First, the trier of fact must consider whether
the plaintiff's alleged disability is a physical or mental impairment. 49
Second, the court must determine whether the impairment substan-
tially limits the plaintiff in performing a major life activity, which re-
43. Vande Zande v. State of Wis. Dept. of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 541 (7th Cir. 1995).
44. See Moore v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 221 F.3d 944, 950 (7th Cir. 2000).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)(B) & (C).
46. 524 U.S. 624.
47. Id.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
49. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 631 (reasoning that "[f]irst, we consider whether respondent's
HIV infection was a physical impairment").
2002]
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quires the court to further decide what qualifies as a major life
activity and must define substantial limits.50
The Bragdon Court began its analysis by investigating whether
the plaintiff was, in fact, physically or mentally impaired.', The Court
deferred to regulations issued by the Department of Health and Hu-
man Services to define a physical or mental impairment as:
(A) any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfig-
urement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following
body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs;
respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive,
digestive, genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine;
or
(B) any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental re-
tardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and
specific learning disabilities.52
The commentary accompanying these regulations contained a
nonexhaustive list of conditions that constituted physical impair-
ments, including cerebral palsy, epilepsy, multiple sclerosis, cancer,
heart disease and alcoholism. 3 Although the plaintiff's claimed im-
pairment, HIV-positive status, was not on the Department of Health's
list, the Court held that "HIV infection satisfies the statutory and
regulatory definition of a physical impairment during every stage of
the disease.
'5 4
The Bragdon Court then moved to the next step, which is deter-
mining whether the impairment affects a major life activity.55 The
plaintiff in Bragdon claimed that because she was HIV-positive, she
was limited in the major life activity of reproduction.5 6 The Court de-
ferred to the Rehabilitation Act regulation's list of major life activi-
ties, which includes "functions such as caring for one's self,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breath-
ing, learning, and working."57 The Court, insisting that the list was
illustrative, not exhaustive, found that "the plain meaning of the word
50. Id. (explaining that "we identify the life activity upon which respondent relies... and
determine whether it constitutes a major life activity under the ADA," and then, "tying the two
statutory phrases together, we ask whether the impairment substantially limited the major life
activity").
51. Id. at 632.
52. Id. at 632-33 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (1997)).
53. Id. at 633.
54. Id. at 637.
55. Id. at 633.
56. Id. at 638.
57. Id. at 638-39 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1997); 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(2) (1997)).
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'major' denotes comparative importance"; s8 thus, because reproduc-
tion is crucial to the life process, it is certainly a major life activity. 59
The final prong of the Bragdon disability analysis is determining
whether the plaintiff's physical or mental impairment substantially
limits the major life activity that the plaintiff asserts. 60 The Court held
that the plaintiff was substantially limited in reproduction because she
posed a risk of infection to the man who would impregnate her as
well as to the child she might conceive.61 While the Bragdon Court
found with relative ease that the HIV-positive plaintiff was
substantially limited in the major life activity of reproduction,62 it left
lower courts still struggling to determine whether less life-threatening
impairments cause substantial limitations in major life activities. In-
deed, the definition of a major life activity is still evolving. 63
The Court in Bragdon solidified the analysis for determining
whether a plaintiff is disabled under the ADA. Bragdon demon-
strated that the court should break down into a three-step inquiry the
definition of disability under subsection (A)-a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. 64 The plain-
tiff must establish each step before continuing on to consider the
merits of the plaintiff's discrimination claim.65
C. Sutton's Consideration of Mitigating Measures
Arguably the most devastating blow to plaintiffs trying to show
that they are disabled under the ADA was the Court's 1999 decision
in Sutton.66 In Sutton, the Court ruled that in determining whether a
plaintiff is substantially limited in a major life activity, a court must
consider the plaintiff's use of mitigating measures that alleviate or
58. Id. at 638.
59. Id. at 638-39.
60. Id. at 639.
61. Id. at 639-41.
62. See id. at 639-44 for a discussion of "substantially limited."
63. Most recently, the Supreme Court in Toyota Motor Manufacturing. v. Williams insisted
that "'major life activities' refers to those activities that are of central importance to daily life."
534 U.S. 184 (2002). The Court held that "[wihen addressing the major life activity of
performing manual tasks, the central inquiry must be whether the claimant is unable to perform
the variety of tasks central to most people's daily lives, not whether the claimant is unable to
perform the tasks associated with her specific job." Id.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
65. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 631.
66. Sutton, 527 U.S. 471.
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correct the impairment.67 Ruling on an issue that had once deeply di-
vided the circuit courts,68 the Supreme Court in Sutton changed the
landscape of ADA analysis.
In Sutton, the plaintiffs were twin sisters who applied for jobs as
airline pilots with United Airlines. 69 Even though their vision could
be corrected to 20/20 with contact lenses, United refused to hire the
plaintiffs because they had uncorrected vision of 20/200 in their right
eyes and 20/400 in their left eyes. 70 In its analysis, the Court refused
to follow the EEOC's "Interpretive Guidance, ' 71 which provided that
determination of whether an individual is disabled should be made
without consideration of mitigating measures, such as medicines, or
assistive or prosthetic devices.7 2 Instead, the Court held that mitigat-
ing measures, "both positive and negative-must be taken into ac-
count when judging whether that person is 'substantially limited' in a
major life activity and thus 'disabled' under the Act.
73
The Court first reasoned that the determination of whether a
plaintiff is disabled under the ADA is an individualized inquiry; thus,
if corrective measures were not regarded in this analysis, courts would
be forced to make determinations based on generalized information
and hypothetical estimations concerning the uncorrected impair-
ment.74 The Court illustrated this by explaining that diabetics are cer-
tainly disabled if they do not take insulin; however, the court will
determine whether a disability exists based on the diabetic plaintiff in
her medicated state.75 When plaintiffs are not considered in their in-
dividual capacity, the Court opined, it "is contrary to both the letter
and the spirit of the ADA. '76 The Court also noted that corrective
67. Id. at 482. The Supreme Court has also recently held in Williams that "to be
substantially limited in performing manual tasks, an individual must have an impairment that
prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central importance
to most people's daily lives." 534 U.S. 184.
68. Timothy S. Bland & Thomas J. Walsh, Jr., U.S. Supreme Court Resolves Mitigating
Measures Issue Under the ADA, 30 U. MEM. L. REV. 1, 10-13 (1999). The Sixth and Tenth
Circuits, and, in dictum, the Fifth Circuit, held that mitigating measures must be considered
when determining disability. The First, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits held that
mitigating measures should not be considered when determining disability.
69. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 479. "No agency, however, has been given authority to issue regulations
implementing the generally applicable provisions of the ADA ......
72. See id. at 480 (citing 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.20) (1998)).
73. Id. at 482.
74. Id. at 483-84.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 484.
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measures, namely drugs, often produce severe negative side effects,
which should be considered by courts when determining when a
plaintiff is disabled." Finally, the Court noted that if Congress in-
tended to include those who are disabled without mitigating or cor-
rective devices, the number of individuals covered by the ADA would
be far higher than the forty-three million noted in the statute.
78
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, wrote a spirited dissent
and argued that mitigating measures should not be considered when
determining if a plaintiff is disabled under the ADA. 79 The dissent
pointed to the possible disparities that could befall plaintiffs who em-
ploy mitigating measures, yet are discriminated against as a result of
their use of these measures.8 0 Justice Stevens noted that many indi-
viduals who are aided by prostheses, through dedication and hard
work, are able to "perform all of their major life activities just as effi-
ciently as an average couch potato. '81 Yet, employers may nonethe-
less be tempted to discriminate against them on the basis of the
corrective measures, in which case, according to the dissent, "that
employer has unquestionably discriminated against the individual in
violation of the Act. '82 The dissent argued that by disallowing these
plaintiffs a cause of action under the ADA, the majority opinion leads
to the "counterintuitive conclusion that the ADA's safeguards vanish
when individuals make themselves more employable by ascertaining
ways to overcome their physical or mental limitations.
''83
II. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S APPLICATION OF THE ADA AFTER
BRAGDON AND SUTTON
While Bragdon provided lower courts with a process for deter-
mining whether a plaintiff is disabled under the ADA,84 and Sutton
added the consideration of mitigating factors, 8 the circuit courts still
77. Id. (listing anti-psychotic drugs, drugs for Parkinson's disease, and anti-epileptic drugs
as examples of corrective measures that produce negative side effects).
78. Id. at 484-88 (claiming that "[h]ad Congress intended to include all persons with
corrected physical limitations among those covered by the Act, it undoubtedly would have cited
a much higher number of disabled persons in the findings"). The Court noted that over 100
million Americans wear corrective lenses alone. Id. at 487.
79. Id. at 495 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 497.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 498.
83. Id. at 499.
84. 524 U.S. 631.
85. 527 U.S. 475.
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struggle to correctly apply these holdings to a variety of individual
cases. Following the Bragdon paradigm, plaintiffs in the Seventh Cir-
cuit claiming discrimination under Title I of the ADA have had little
trouble initially convincing the courts that they have a physical or
mental impairment. 86 The real challenge to plaintiffs is proving that
they are substantially limited in a major life activity, and are, there-
fore, disabled. 87  Sutton has made this step even more difficult for
plaintiffs by requiring courts to also consider corrective measures.88
This additional mandatory consideration has led to counterintuitive
results.
A. The Seventh Circuit's Treatment of "Impairment" under the ADA
While the Bragdon Court went into a detailed determination of
whether the plaintiff in the case met the impairment requirement, 89
the Seventh Circuit's focus is now on whether the impairment sub-
stantially limits a major life activity rather than on whether a plaintiff
has a physical or mental impairment.90 In fact, many defendants in
Title I cases concede that the plaintiff has a physical impairment,
while still arguing that the plaintiff is not disabled. In recent Seventh
Circuit cases, defendants have conceded that a variety of conditions
constituted a physical impairment, including a heart condition and
diabetes, 91 arthritis, 9 and, in one case, a plaintiff's fear of driving.93
The existence of an impairment is rarely at issue because the ADA
"is not a general protection of being medically afflicted.... If the
employer discriminates against [plaintiffs] on account of their being
ill, even permanently ill, but not disabled, there is no violation." 94
86. See Lisa Eichhorn, Applying the ADA to Mitigating Measures Cases: A Choice of
Statutory Evils, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1071, 1085-86 (1999) (claiming that "litigants rarely disagree
over the 'physical or mental impairment' element.., the 'major life activity' and 'substantially
limits' elements tend to constitute the battleground").
87. Id.
88. 527 U.S. at 475.
89. See 524 U.S. at 632-637.
90. See Webb, 230 F.3d at 998 (discussing immediately, when determining whether plaintiff
was disabled, substantial limitation of a major life activity); Schneiker v. Fortis Ins. Co., 200 F.3d
1055, 1060 (7th Cir. 2000) (asks immediately, when determining disability, whether impairment
substantially limits plaintiff's ability to work).
91. Davis v. Rockford Spring Co., No. 98 C 50351, 98 C 50352, 2000 WL 1847567, at *4
(N.D. II1. Dec. 12, 2000).
92. Moore, 221 F.3d at 952-53.
93. Sinkler v. Midwest Prop. Mgmt. Ltd. P'ship, 209 F.3d 678, 683 (7th Cir. 2000).
94. Skorup v. Modern Door Corp., 153 F.3d 512, 514 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Christian v.
St. Anthony Med. Ctr. Inc., 117 F.3d 1051, 1053 (7th Cir. 1997)).
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B. The Seventh Circuit's Treatment of "Major Life Activity"
The Supreme Court held in Bragdon that when a court deter-
mines what constitutes a disability, it must consider the life activity
that the plaintiff describes as being limited and "determine whether it
constitutes a major life activity." 95  While the Court hesitated to
enunciate a general principle when determining what constitutes a
major life activity, it endorsed a list established by the Rehabilitation
Act regulations which includes "functions such as caring for one's
self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning and working." 96 The Court was quick to point out,
however, that the list was merely "illustrative, not exhaustive." 97
Since Bragdon, Seventh Circuit plaintiffs have met with little
success in arguing that certain activities that are not included in the
EEOC's list should be considered "major life activities." 98  When
analyzing whether an unlisted activity constitutes a major life activity,
the trier of fact must consider "whether the unlisted activity has equal
4significance''' to that of the listed activities within the meaning of the
ADA.99 Recently, the Seventh Circuit held that the inability to bowl,
camp, restore cars, and mow the lawn as a result of arthritis were not
major life activities. 1°° The Seventh Circuit has also held that while
getting to and from work is a subspecies of "'working' or 'driving,"'
commuting is nonetheless not a major life activityQ10 Additionally,
the Seventh Circuit recently found that although a plaintiff was lim-
ited in his "communication skills and interpersonal relationships,"
these did not qualify as major life activities.102 Finally, in Furnish v.
SVI Systems, Inc., the Seventh Circuit held that an employee with cir-
rhosis of the liver caused by chronic Hepatitis B was not disabled be-
cause "[a]lthough liver function is 'integral to one's daily existence' in
that one needs a healthy liver to remove toxins from the blood, liver
function is not 'integral to one's daily existence' under Bragdon and
95. 524 U.S. at 631.
96. Id. at 638-39 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1997); 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(2) (1997)).
97. Id. at 639.
98. See Eichhorn, supra note 29, at 1428-33 (arguing that the categorization of activities
that the regulations consider "major" lack a common thread).
99. See Sinkler, 209 F.3d at 684.
100. Moore, 221 F.3d at 951.
101. See Sinkler, 209 F.3d at 685.
102. Hoeller v. Eaton Corp., 149 F.3d 621, 625 (7th Cir. 1998).
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it's progeny."'13 In other words, the court determined that the func-
tioning of a major organ is not a major life activity.1°4
C. The Seventh Circuit's Treatment of "Substantially Limited"
Those plaintiffs who successfully claim that their impairments
limit a legitimate major life activity must face the second, more diffi-
cult hurdle of proving that their disability leaves them "substantially
limited" in that major life activity.105 Since Bragdon, the Seventh Cir-
cuit has held that to be substantially limited under the ADA, the
plaintiff must show that they are either unable to perform the major
life activity or are "significantly restricted as to the condition, manner
or duration under which the individual can perform a major life ac-
tivity as compared to an average person in the general population."' 06
The Sutton Court added the requirement that courts must also con-
sider the plaintiff's medicated or mitigated state. 1°7 Most recently, in
Toyota Motor Mfg. Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, the Court held that the
word substantial suggests "considerable" or "to a large degree," 10
103. Furnish, 270 F.3d at 449-50 (citing Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 635).
104. Id. at 450.
105. See Eichhorn, supra note 29, at 1430 (claiming that the additional inquiry to determine
whether an impairment "substantially limits" a major life activity "indicates a desire to restrict
the ADA's coverage to the 'truly disabled"').
106. Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 506 (7th Cir. 1998). While the ADA
does not strictly require plaintiffs who are claiming discrimination based on their disability to
necessarily show that they are limited in the major life activity of working, many of the plaintiffs
in Title I cases do claim that they are substantially limited in working. To show that a plaintiff is
substantially limited in his or her ability to work, the plaintiff must show that the impairment
significantly restricts "the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in
various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and
abilities." Thus, a plaintiff is not substantially limited if they are precluded from working one
particular job or if "he or she is unable to perform a specialized job or profession requiring
extraordinary skill, prowess or talent"; instead, employment must be impaired generally.
As a result of the narrow interpretation of what is substantially limiting, a plaintiff's
inability to perform the job of their choice, or a specialized class of jobs, is simply not enough to
satisfy the disability requirement under the ADA. For example, the Seventh Circuit has held
that an employee who suffered from depression, anxiety, and TMJ disorder as a result of
working for a particular supervisor was not disabled under the ADA because "if she can do the
same job for another supervisor, she can do the job." Weiler v. Household Fin. Corp., 101 F.3d
519, 525 (7th Cir. 1996). Likewise, the Seventh Circuit has found that a plaintiff who suffered
from severe asthma, osteoporosis, and a weakened immune system was not substantially limited
in the major life activity of working because he was not limited as a psychologist generally, but
only as a psychologist who works with patients "coping with intense developmental problems."
Webb, 230 F.3d at 998-99.
107. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.
108. Williams, 122 S. Ct. at 691 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 2280 (1976)).
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thus precluding "impairments that interfere in only a minor way with
the performance of manual tasks from qualifying as disabilities"109
While the full effect of the Sutton decision still remains unclear,
Seventh Circuit case law indicates that plaintiffs searching for protec-
tion under the ADA will encounter a heightened standard that may
lead to disparate results. For example, an employee who is treated
differently by an employer because the employee takes medication
that alleviates a potential disability has no cause of action under the
ADA. 10 In the recent case of Krocka v. City of Chicago, the Seventh
Circuit held that a plaintiff who suffered from depression but was
able to function normally while taking the drug Prozac was not pro-
tected under the ADA."' The plaintiff, a police officer, was allowed
to work only if he participated in the department's Personnel Con-
cerns Program, which closely monitored certain officers, usually those
with disciplinary problems. " ' The employer conceded that the plain-
tiff was placed in the program solely because he took the drug Pro-
zac. 113 While, at least arguably, most courts would consider the
employer's placing the plaintiff in a disciplinary program solely be-
cause of his medication to be discriminatory,,14 the Seventh Circuit
was unable to reach the merits of the case. Instead, the court was
forced to hold that because Prozac alleviated his severe depression,
the plaintiff was not disabled in the first place, and therefore, had no
cause of action under the ADA."5 However, if the plaintiff did not
take the medication, he would surely be considered disabled by the
court. 1
6
Other Seventh Circuit decisions have struggled with the coun-
terintuitive effect that Sutton has on claims by plaintiffs who are not
109. Id.
110. See Krocka v. City of Chicago, 203 F.3d 507, 513 (7th Cir. 2000).
111. Id. at 513.
112. Id.
113. Id. (finding that "Krocka would remain in the [disciplinary program] for as long as he
was taking Prozac. It was the opinion of Krocka's doctors that he would be on Prozac for the
rest of his life.").
114. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1). The word "discriminate" includes "limiting, segregating or
classifying a[n] ... employee in a way adversely that affects the opportunities or status of
such ... employee because of the disability of such.., employee."
115. Krocka, 203 F.3d at 513.
116. Id. at 511. Herein lies the possible Catch-22: on the one hand, if the plaintiff did not
take his medication, he would quite possibly not be considered "otherwise qualified" under the
Act because he would not be able to perform the essential functions of his job. Yet, on the
other hand, because he is able to correct his disability with medication, the very reason for
which his employer treats him differently, he still is not considered disabled under the Act.
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allowed to employ their corrective measures on the job. For example,
in Nawrot v. CPC International,'1 7 the district court found that be-
cause the diabetic plaintiff was largely able to control his impairment
through insulin shots and eating snacks, he was not disabled under the
ADA.118 The plaintiff's claim was that his employer, who refused to
allow him to take breaks to tend to his diabetic condition, did not
reasonably accommodate his disability.119 Essentially, his employer
prevented him from taking the very medicine that disqualified him
from being considered disabled under the ADA.20 The frustrated
court commented on how applying Sutton distortedly requires a court
to first consider the mitigating measure when determining whether
the plaintiff is disabled and entitled to protection under the ADA. 1'
The lower court in Nawrot noted:
Here, a question of material fact exists as to whether [the em-
ployer] prohibited [the employee] from controlling his diabetic
condition. Yet according to Sutton, this court cannot reach the
question of discrimination because [the employee] is not deemed
disabled when viewed in his corrected state, and as such, is not in-
cluded within the purview of the ADA.'22
In finding that the plaintiff was not actually disabled, the court
concluded that "[i]n the aftermath of Sutton, ADA plaintiffs are
placed in a legal bind: the employer strips the plaintiff of all ameliora-
tive measures, but in court, the judge pretends that the plaintiff is al-




The plaintiff in Nawrot appealed his case to the Seventh Circuit.
Although the Seventh Circuit eventually found that Mr. Nawrot was
disabled, the court ignored the crucial issue that frustrated the lower
court. 24 Instead of focusing on the employer's refusal to allow the in-
sulin shots, the court reasoned that even with the help of insulin,
Nawrot was disabled because the mitigating measures that Nawrot
relied upon, "[d]espite the most diligent care... [could] not com-
pletely control his blood sugar level.' ' 25 The Seventh Circuit went on
117. Nawrot v. CPC Int'l., No. 99 C 630, 2000 WL 816787 (N.D. Ill. June 22, 2000), affd in
part, rev'd in part, Nawrot v. CPC Int'l., 277 F.3d 896 (7th Cir. 2002).
118. Nawrot, 2000 WL 816787, at *6.
119. Id. at 1.
120. Id. at 6-7.
121. Id. at 7.
122. Id. at 7.
123. Id. at 8.
124. Nawrot, 277 F.3d at 904-05.
125. Id. at 905.
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to hold that the employer's proffered reasons for terminating the
plaintiff were not pretextual1
26
District courts within the Seventh Circuit that have applied the
Sutton mitigating-measures analysis to ADA cases have also reached
results that clearly contradict Congress's intent to bring widespread
relief to the disabled.127 In Denney v. Mosey Mfg. Inc., the court
commented that it would be unimaginable for an employee who was
prevented by his employer from using corrective measures on the job
to be beyond the purview of the ADA.' 28 In Denney, a diabetic
brought an employment discrimination claim against his employer,
arguing that the employer interfered with his use of corrective meas-
ures on the job, such as eating snacks, which were essential to his
ability to do the job and to his overall well-being.129 In its motion for
summary judgment, the employer argued that the ADA does not stop
an employer from "refusing arbitrarily even the most modest accom-
modation" to a diabetic plaintiff because the plaintiff is not consid-
ered disabled when the impairment is corrected by insulin.130 The
court disagreed and remarked, "[I]t is inconceivable that such actions
by an employer would be entirely beyond the reach of the ADA on
the theory that the employee does not have a disability under the
ADA."'' Yet the court refused to decide the "abstract legal issue"
because it found that the plaintiff had not come forward with enough
evidence to show that the defendant had truly interfered with his ef-
forts to control his diabetes.
132
The decisions in Krocka,1 33 Nawrot34 and Denney135 all signal that
the Sutton mitigating-measures analysis can sometimes lead to
frustrating consequences for plaintiffs who have a legitimate claim of
discrimination. These cases illustrate that in order to fully effectuate
the integrity and the purpose of the ADA, mitigating measures
should not always be considered by the courts.
126. Id. at 906-07.
127. Denney, 2000 WL 680417, at *10.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 8.
130. Id. at 10.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Krocka, 203 F.3d 507.
134. Narowt, 2000 WL 816787, at *7.
135. Denney, 2000 WL 690417, at *10.
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III. A MODIFICATION TO THE SUTTON ANALYSIS: WHY IN SOME
CASES COURTS SHOULD NOT CONSIDER MITIGATING MEASURES
The Sutton mitigating-measures requirement has put courts in
the untenable position of having to find that a plaintiff who is being
discriminated against because of his or her mitigating measures is not
disabled, and thus, not protected under the ADA. What the Sutton
decision has failed to allow the courts to consider is that employers,
depending upon their willingness to accommodate the plaintiff's par-
ticular desires, requests and physical needs, can play a crucial role in
the determination of whether the plaintiff is considered disabled.
Courts should not be required to consider the plaintiff's mitigated
state before reaching the merits in limited cases, such as when an em-
ployer discriminates on the basis of a mitigating measure or refuses to
allow a plaintiff to employ a mitigating measure. A better rule would
be for the courts to first determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether
there is a reasonable possibility that the employer is discriminating on
the basis of the mitigating measure. After determining that a reason-
able possibility exists that such discrimination is occurring, the court
could determine whether the plaintiff is disabled without performing
the mitigating-measure analysis. Finally, if the plaintiff is disabled
without the corrective measure, the court could then reach the dis-
crimination issue.
A. When the Seventh Circuit Should Not Consider Mitigating
Measures
In certain instances, courts should be able to disregard corrective
measures when determining whether a plaintiff is disabled. Courts
should initially consider whether there is a reasonable likelihood that
the employer is discriminating against the plaintiff on the basis of
their use of a corrective measure. Consider, for example, the case of
Krocka, where the employer discriminated against the plaintiff solely
because he took psychiatric medication.16 Before the district court
could consider the discrimination issue, it was forced to first deter-
mine that the plaintiff was not disabled because he was able to greatly
alleviate his severe depression by taking Prozac. 13 7 The court had no
choice but to dismiss the case prior to considering the discrimination
136. Krocka, 203 F.3d 507.
137. Id. at 513.
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issue, leaving the employer free to discriminate with impunity. 38 If
the Krocka court instead first considered whether there was a reason-
able likelihood that the plaintiff was being discriminated against by
his employer because of his use of psychiatric medication, then the
court could have reached the merits of the case. Because the em-
ployer freely admitted that the plaintiff was being heavily supervised
solely because of his use of Prozac, 39 the reasonable likelihood prong
of the proposed test would be easily met. Then the court would de-
termine whether the plaintiff is disabled without considering his
medication. If his symptoms were severe enough, which they argua-
bly were, the court would find that the plaintiff is disabled and then
the court would be free to determine the discrimination issue.
Also when evaluating whether the plaintiff is substantially lim-
ited in the activity of working, the court must be able to consider
whether the employer prohibits or interferes with the plaintiff's use of
mitigating measures on the job. If a court is going to consider miti-
gating measures in its disability analysis, it should be a prerequisite
that those corrective measures are allowed on the job. If not, a court
may be forced to come to the counterintuitive result that a diabetic is
not disabled because she can maintain her condition by employing
simple corrective measures, like taking insulin and maintaining a bal-
anced diet, even though she is not afforded the opportunity to do so
on her job. Or consider, as a more dramatic illustration, Justice Ste-
vens's example in Sutton of a plaintiff who, with her prosthetic leg, is
not substantially limited in any major life activity. 40 If an employer
refused to let the plaintiff wear her prosthetic leg at work, and the
plaintiff then filed a claim against her employer, the court could ar-
guably dismiss the case, finding that with the mitigating measure, the
plaintiff is not disabled and has no cause of action under the ADA.
1
41
Such inequitable results could be avoided if courts disregarded
the mitigating measure in the preliminary disability consideration. In
the case of diabetic persons, courts should first look to whether there
is a reasonable likelihood that the employer prevented the plaintiff
138. Id.
139. Id. at 511.
140. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 497-98 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
141. See id., (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that "[tihe fact that a prosthetic device, such as
an artificial leg, has restored one's ability to perform major life activities surely cannot mean
that ... the definition is inapplicable."); but see id. at 488 (majority claiming that "individuals
who use prosthetic limbs... may be mobile ... but still disabled because of a substantial
limitation on their ability to walk or run.").
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from taking snack and insulin breaks. If it seems reasonably likely,
then the court would determine that the plaintiff is disabled because
without insulin and maintaining a strict diet serious illness or death
could occur. The court would then be free to determine the disposi-
tive issue of whether the employer discriminated against the plaintiff.
B. The Supreme Court's Reasoning in Sutton Supports the Proposed
Approach
Although the Supreme Court insisted in Sutton that mitigating
measures must always be considered when determining disability un-
der the ADA, 142 the Court failed to consider that employers some-
times discriminate on the basis of those corrective measures. A court
could leave the Sutton reasoning intact and still skip the mitigating-
measures analysis where it determines that an employer is discrimi-
nating on the basis of those measures. The Sutton Court reasoned
that mitigating measures must be considered because, if not, the dis-
ability inquiry would become a generalized, de-individualized en-
deavor,143 and because Congress's recognition of forty-three million
disabled Americans certainly was not meant to include all of those
plaintiffs whose measures were correctable.,- The Court also legiti-
mately feared an influx of claims against employers. 45 Yet, if the
courts were to disregard mitigating measures only in situations where
an employer refuses to allow, or discriminates on the basis of, a miti-
gating measure, the inquiry would remain individualized, the number
of disabled plaintiffs would only increase slightly, and the interests of
employers would still be protected.
1. The Inquiry Would Remain Individualized
First, the Court in Sutton stressed that the determination of
whether a plaintiff is disabled is a highly individualized inquiry.146
The Court reasoned that courts should not be forced to speculate and
make generalized decisions about what a plaintiff's condition might
142. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.
143. Id. at 483-84.
144. Id. at 484-88.
145. See id. at 487. The Court noted that "[h]ad Congress intended to include all persons
with corrected physical limitations among those covered by the Act, it undoubtedly would have
cited a much higher number of disabled persons in the findings."
146. Id. at 483-84.
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be without his or her mitigating measures.'47 Such an approach, the
Court opined, would encourage courts to treat plaintiffs as "members
of a group of people with similar impairments, rather than individu-
als."148 However, when plaintiffs argue that they are being discrimi-
nated against because of their mitigating measure or that they are not
allowed to use their mitigating measure on the job, the Sutton ruling
has forced courts to do just what the Court feared-treat the plaintiff
as member of a group, a class of people whose disabilities are always
determined by considering corrective measures. If courts consider in-
stead the possibility that in some cases the employer could be dis-
criminating on the basis of the mitigating measure, then the
determination would remain consistent with the Court's interpreta-
tion of the ADA. In addition, Congress's original intent of designing
a statute to protect disabled individuals would be furthered.
1 49
2. Plaintiffs Whose Mitigating Measures Are Not Considered Will
Still Be a Discrete Few
The Sutton Court was persuaded by Congress's estimation that
roughly forty-three million Americans were disabled when it held
that mitigating measures must be considered in the determination of
whether a plaintiff is disabled.150 The Court, pointing out that the
number of Americans who need corrective lenses alone is 100 mil-
lion,,5 ' reasoned that the estimate under the ADA reflected Congres-
sional intent not to include every single person whose impairment
could be corrected by mitigating measures.'52 The Court was arguably
concerned with interpreting the ADA in a manner that would afford
overly broad protection to individuals and result in a rash of lawsuits
against employers. Yet, if an exception is made in highly limited
situations, such as when an employer discriminates on the basis of a
mitigating measure or when the employer refuses to allow an
employee to use a corrective measure, only a select group of plaintiffs
would be able to surpass the threshold disability requirement.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) & (2). "It is the purpose of this chapter to provide a clear
and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals
with disabilities; to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing
discrimination against individuals with disabilities." Id. (emphasis added).
150. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 484-88.
151. Id. at 487.
152. Id. at 484-88.
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The number of those who Congress intended to include under
the purview of the ADA would not be dramatically altered if courts
were able to occasionally disregard mitigating measures because cer-
tain employment positions legitimately allow employers to refuse to
permit employees from relying on their mitigating measures. As a re-
sult, these cases would not exempt the court from considering the
plaintiff's mitigating measures. 13 For example, in Sutton, the plain-
tiffs, who were airline pilot applicants, were evaluated without being
allowed to wear their corrective lenses, which were considered miti-
gating measures.154 Yet, the Court in Sutton most likely recognized
that obliging a pilot to have 20/20 vision is a valid job requirement,
and thus, denial of employment based upon the plaintiffs' need to
wear corrective lenses was acceptable. 15 5 Compare the employer in
Sutton, however, to an employer who arbitrarily denies a plaintiff
from using a mitigating measure based strictly on stereotypes or ani-
mus. If, for example, an employer refuses to allow a plaintiff who
uses a hearing aid to wear the device while working because the em-
ployer feels it is unattractive or makes the plaintiff appear unap-
proachable, the plaintiff in the case surely should be protected under
the ADA. The employer in that case has no legitimate reason to
deny the plaintiff use of the mitigating measure, without which she
would be disabled.
3. Employers Interests Are Not Threatened by the Modification
Critics of this proposed modification to the Sutton analysis may
argue that it will result in a windfall for ADA plaintiffs while greatly
disadvantaging and burdening employers. However, this position
fails to consider that the ADA is a balance between employer and
plaintiff interests. By allowing courts to ignore the mitigating meas-
ures upon which plaintiffs rely in a very limited number of cases, the
deserving plaintiffs' rights to protection under the ADA are better
balanced against the interests of the employer. In short, the employ-
153. See id. at 493-94 ("An otherwise valid job requirement, such as a height requirement,
does not become invalid simply because it would limit a person's employment opportunities in a
substantial way if it were adopted by a substantial number of employers.").
154. Id. at 475-76.
155. See 42 U.S.C. §12113(a) ("It may be a defense to a charge of discrimination under this
chapter that an alleged application of qualification standards, tests, or selection criteria that
screen out or tend to screen out or otherwise deny a job benefit to an individual with a disability
has been shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity, and such performance
cannot be accomplished by reasonable accommodation.").
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ers' interests would still be protected by a number of other statutory
safeguards. For example, the ADA does not protect an employee
who, because of his physical or mental impairment, cannot ade-
quately perform his job.156 Instead, the statute only protects a plaintiff
who is a "qualified individual,"'' 15 that is, a plaintiff who "can perform
the essential functions of the employment position."'58  Even if a
plaintiff surpasses the threshold disability requirement under the
ADA, the defendant only has the duty to find a "reasonable accom-
modation 15 9 for the qualified individual with a disability, which "can
take various forms, such as making the workplace accessible to a per-
son who is wheelchair-bound, or... 'reassignment [of the disabled
person] to a vacant position." ' 16 Thus, under the proposed approach,
a diabetic plaintiff would be considered disabled by the court, yet the
employer would still only be required to grant the employees insulin
breaks if those accommodations were considered reasonable by the
court. Furthermore, the employer need not grant the plaintiff an ac-
commodation if the accommodation would cause an undue financial
burden 161 upon the employer. Thus, the proposed modification does
not advocate that employers be required to make more extensive or
costly accommodations for the disabled; the approach simply suggests
that more plaintiffs should surpass the disability threshold so that
courts are free to determine the discrimination issue.
CONCLUSION
When enacting the ADA, Congress recognized that "individuals
with disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimina-
156. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 55 (1990), reprinted in U.S.C.A.A.N. 337 ("By
including the phrase 'qualified individual with a disability,' the Committee intends to reaffirm
that this legislation does not undermine an employer's ability to chose and maintain qualified
workers.").
157. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). "The term 'qualified individual with a disability' means an
individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires."
158. Id.
159. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(A) & (B).
160. E.E.O.C. v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1026 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B)).
161. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) ("[T]he term 'discriminate' includes not making
reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise
qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity




tion"162 in the workplace. Recent Seventh Circuit case law has shown
that discrimination can take the form of an employer refusing to al-
low an employee to use corrective measures on the job 163 or an em-
ployer treating an employee differently solely because of the
employee's use of a mitigating measure. 164 While Congress surely
meant to include these individuals under the umbrella of ADA pro-
tection, the Court's required mitigating-measures analysis has left the
courts in the untenable position of finding that these plaintiffs do not
qualify as disabled under the statute. 65 Such a counterintuitive result
could be avoided, however, if courts did not consider the plaintiffs
mitigated state where an employer is discriminating based on the
mitigating measure itself. If courts adopted this modified approach to
Sutton, Congress's original intention of eliminating discrimination
against individuals with disabilities 166 would be further realized.
162. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5).
163. See Denney, 2000 WL 680417, at *10; Nawrot, 2000 WL 816787, at *7.
164. See Krocka, 203 F.3d 507.
165. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.
166. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) ("It is the purpose of this chapter to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities.").
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